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Abstract: A system is proposed that is capable of identifying the true originator of an email message. 
This information can be combined with existing whitelist and blacklist technology to provide an effective 
anti-spam system. The approach is to store validation information that can be traced to the sender and 
to utilize a “Reachback URL” in the message to access the validation information. The approach 
proposed here has a number of advantages over existing systems. It does not require use of DNS, it can 
use the existing email distribution system, it is robust against in-transit header modifications and mail 
forwarding, and it can identify sources down to the granularity of individual email addresses. It can be 
incrementally deployed by individual users and can provide incremental value through automated 
whitelisting. 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Spam email (spam for short) is an unsolicited 
email message that has been sent 
indiscriminately to massive numbers of users. 
Despite major efforts to suppress spam email, 
the distribution of spam continues to plague 
email users. Estimates vary, but there is some 
consensus that 60-80% of all email is now spam 
email. The problem has become especially 
pressing in recent months [15] because sites 
have seen a 50% increase in spam. This 
represents a tremendous burden on users. 
To date, there are three primary approaches for 
suppressing spam. Content filters such as 
SpamAssassin [2] are the most common 
approach. A content filter examines each email 
message and based on its content, the filter 
provides an estimate of the probability that that 
piece of email is spam.  
Another approach is called “whitelisting” [13]. 
A whitelist is a set of addresses that the receiver 
believes to be non-spam sources. Any email 
from a site on the whitelist is accepted and all 
others are rejected.  
The other common approach is called 
“blacklisting” [1,9,18,19], which is essentially 
the complement of whitelisting. A blacklist is a 
set of email addresses that are believed to be 
sources of spam email. 
Blacklists and whitelists can be used in 
combination. As a rule, a whitelist for an 
individual user will be much smaller than a 
blacklist. So it is useful to test the email address 
first against a whitelist. If it is on the whitelist, 
then there is no need to perform the more costly 
blacklist check. 
Blacklisting and whitelisting depend critically 
on the ability to accurately identify the true 
source of an email message. Unfortunately, it is 
easy to forge (“spoof”) the source address in the 
From header in an email message [6]. This 
means that a spammer can send email that has a 
fake source address that will not be caught. 
This paper proposes a novel mechanism for 
accurately identifying the true source of an 
email message. Briefly, it adds information to 
each email message that provides access to a 
source of validation information that produces 
unforgeable evidence of the true source of the 
email address. Generically, this new method 
(and associated infrastructure) is referred to as 
“Reachback.” The Reachback system computes 
verification information about each sent email. 
The original message is augmented with a 
special “Reachback” header containing a URL 
(Uniform Resource Locator) [5]. This 
Reachback URL points to an information source 
– a Reachback server – that contains the 
information needed to verify a specific email 
message. This combination of server, of its 
internet IP address, and of the validation 
information combination allows a recipient to 
reliably infer a connection from the email 
message to the Reachback URL, then to the 
Reachback server, and finally to the email 
sender. 
Reachback has several advantages compared to 
existing approaches. 
• It does not use the Domain Name System 
(DNS) to store validation information. 
• It can be used both for blacklisting and as an 
automated whitelist. 
• It can utilize a variety of servers to provide 
Reachback validation information; it can 
even delegate the validation information to 
servers outside of the sender’s domain. 
• It can support very fine grain validation: 
down to the level of individual email 
addresses. 
• It has the option to use simple secret keys 
rather than public/private pairs because the 
decryption burden can be transferred to the 
Reachback server. 
2.  SPAM SUPPRESSION USING 
REACHBACK 
Spam suppression is initiated by the receiver 
when the email is received by the mail transfer 
agent (MTA) for an intended recipient of the 
message. This email is in the form of a normal 
email using the normal email transport 
mechanisms. Note that the message may have 
traversed any number of sites before arriving at 
the recipient’s MTA. This means that it may 
have been forwarded, passed through a mail list, 
or even passed through an open email relay. 
Either the recipient’s mail transfer agent (MTA) 
or the recipients email client program (aka mail 
user agent (MUA)) carries out the following 
procedure to validate a received email message. 
1. Extract the Reachback URL from the 
appropriate email header line. 
2. Use the URL to obtain the verification 
information stored at the Reachback server at 
the source. 
3. Apply the verification information to the 
message to accurately validate the source of 
the email message. The Reachback URL 
header line is left in the validated message 
but rewritten to indicate that it has been used 
to validate the content. 
4. If the validation fails, then the email is 
marked as not invalid. 
5. If the validation succeeds, then the URL is 
tested first against a whitelist of known good 
sources, and then against a blacklist to 
determine if this particular source is a known 
spam source. The message can then be 
marked with that determination. 
3. REACHBACK FOR WHITELISTS 
In order for Reachback to achieve wide-spread 
use, there must be some advantage in 
incremental adoption. Reachback provides this 
advantage in the form of an effective automated 
whitelist in addition to it use for blacklists. Any 
clique of users that mutually adopts Reachback 
is immediately guaranteed that the members of 
the clique are not spammers (or will be 
suppressed if they are). The advantage over 
traditional whitelists is that the set of acceptable 
senders can grow without action by the previous 
members of the clique. This can be a big 
advantage in certain institutions such as 
Universities. The clique is the set of personnel 
in the University, which is a rapidly changing 
population. Reachback implementation is also 
relatively easy because email transmission is 
often a centralized function in Universities and 
because most University personnel have access 
to a personal web page. Every user that adopts 
Reachback automatically enters the clique of 
accepted users, and this provides an incentive to 
adopt Reachback. 
4.  REACHBACK VALIDATION 
INFORMATION  
The key to the operation of Reachback is the 
validation information returned by accessing a 
Reachback URL. This information consists of 
the following items. 
1. Key: A public key from a public/private key 
pair. 
2. Address: An email address. 
3. Signature: A signature covering the 
information in items 1 and 2 and computed 
using the private key associated with item 1. 
For convenience the term RVI is used for 
combination of three items and the three items 
are referred to by RVI.key, RVI.address and 
RVI.signature respectively.  
5. REACHBACK URL FORMAT 
The form of the Reachback URL is critical for 
inferring the source of an email. Recall that a 
URL is of the general form 
“http://domainname.tld/path” [5], where 
“domainname.tld” is the DNS name of a 
particular machine and “path” is a sequence of 
names separated by the forward slash character. 
For a given domain name prefix, the set of 
possible paths effectively forms a tree. Each 
specific path can be used to identify an 
individual source. Thus the URL for a message 
from user Bob might map to the URL 
“http://yahoo.com/Bob.” The assumed format is 
actually a little more complex because it must 
be possible to algorithmically infer the email 
address of the sender from the URL; as 
discussed in the next section, this is necessary 
for comparison with RVI.address. 
Consider an email with RVI.address equal to 
 “dennis.heimbigner@cs.colorado.edu.” 
This must have a Reachback URL of the form 
 
“http://www.cs.colorado.edu/X/dennis.h
eimbigner,” 
where X is some universally standardized file 
prefix. 
This URL structuring makes it possible for 
blacklist systems to attribute the email source to 
a very fine degree. So rather than blocking all of 
Yahoo because Bob is sending spam, only Bob 
needs to be blocked, and this can be applied by 
using the Reachback URL. 
6.  SOURCE VERIFICATION USING 
REACHBACK 
At the sending source, a digital signature for the 
email is computed using a checksum of the 
email’s content plus a private key from a 
public/private key pair. This digital signature is 
included in the email message. For simplicity, it 
can be assumed that is it included as an 
otherwise ignored parameter in the Reachback 
URL, but it could be placed, for example, at the 
end of the message body. 
An email message recipient obtains the RVI 
using the Reachback URL in the email message. 
This RVI is itself validated by using the RVI.key 
field information to validate the RVI.signature. 
Given the valid RVI, the email message is 
validated as follows. 
1. Compute the checksum of the message body 
(call it CSUM). 
2. Use RVI.key to decrypt the digital signature 
to produce the sender’s checksum. Compare 
this to CSUM. If they do not match, then 
declare the message invalid. 
3. Verify that RVI.address is consistent with the 
Reachback URL as described in the previous 
section. 
4. If the validation passes steps 2 and 3, it can 
be inferred that the message did indeed come 
from the email address specified in 
RVI.address. 
5. Test RVI.address against a whitelist of 
accepted sources and/or a blacklist to 
determine if the message came from a known 
spam source. Mark the message accordingly. 
The Reachback URL defines the true source of 
an email. Unlike other approaches, Reachback 
can completely ignore any From header in the 
email. The information accessed through the 
Reachback URL is sufficient to both identify the 
source and to verify that the email came from 
that source. 
7. THE REACHBACK SERVER 
It must be possible to associate the source of the 
RVI to the sender of the email. This allows a 
recipient to infer a connection from the email 
message to the Reachback URL, then to a 
Reachback server, and finally to the email 
sender. 
Any server that can be accessed by some well-
known URL protocol can be used as the server 
for Reachback information. The simplest form 
of information source is an HTTP server that is 
trusted by the sender and is located in the same 
domain as the sender. The Reachback 
information is placed at a well-known location 
under the sender’s web page. The rest of this 
paper will assume this is the case. 
8.  COSTS 
This approach is not without cost. It requires 
resources from each site that sends or receives 
email using Reachback. 
1. The sending site must support an HTTP-
server for the users at its site. This server is 
used for accessing validation information 
about email messages that it distributes. 
2. The sending site must store for some period 
the public keys used to validate the 
signatures. 
3. The sender must bear the cost of computing 
the digital signature.  
4. The receiver must bear the cost of validating 
the digital signature. 
5. The receiver may optionally bear the cost of 
caching Reachback information (Section 
9.3). 
None of these costs is especially onerous. 
9.  IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE 
Implementing Reachback requires the insertion 
of three new components into the normal email 
transfer architecture. These components are (1) 
the HTTP server, (2) the sender-side proxy that 
inserts the Reachback URL into the email 
message, and (3) the receiver side validator. 
There are a number of ways to do this insertion 
as described in the next two sections.  
9.1 Sender-Side Implementation 
Figures 1a and 1b show two possible 
placements for the sender-side proxy. Whatever 
the placement, the proxy takes a message and 
constructs the validation information (the digital 
signature) from the message contents and a 
private key. The critical assumption is that the 
sender maintains a web page to hold the 
corresponding public key needed to validate the 
digital signature. Further, the server holding this 
page must be accessible from any potential 
recipient of email coming from this sender. 
Figure 1a is preferred because it can provide a 
Reachback system for a whole site. However, 
Figure 1b is valuable if an individual user wants 
to implement Reachback without waiting for 
site-wide implementation. This is a significant 
difference with DNS-based approaches, where 
site-wide implementation is necessary. 
Incremental adoption by individual users is 
effectively impossible when DNS is used.  
It is also possible to define some variations on 
the placements in the figures. For each 
placement, it is possible to merge the proxy with 
the component on either side: the email client or 
the MTA (typically an SMTP server). The latter 
is preferable because it allows the insertion of a 
Reachback URL into every message. This 
includes automatically generated emails 
indicating error conditions. This is not possible 
when the proxy is merged with the email client 
because that client will never see the error 
email. 
The HTTP server is also subject to merging with 
the MTA. This is possible because the MTA is 
usually already accessible from elsewhere on 
the Internet, hence it is easy for it to also export 
an HTTP server interface. This situation is 
unlikely to be needed in practice because of the 
general availability of web servers. It would 
however be useful if other key signing protocols 
are used (Section 12). 
9.2 Recipient-Side Implementation 
Figures 2b and 2b show two possible 
placements for a receiver-side validation proxy. 
As with the sender side, this proxy may be 
merged with components on either side. This 
proxy takes a message, uses the Reachback 
URL to obtain the validation information and 
validates the message. 
Figure 2a shows the preferred placement. Here 
the validation proxy acts as an SMTP proxy that 
receives all incoming mail, validates it, and 
passes it on to the site’s normal MTA: Postfix, 
for example.  
Figure 2b places the proxy between the usual 
POP3/IMAP server and the email client. The 
proxy implements a wrapper for POP3 or IMAP 
mail delivery systems that can perform 
validation. Every recipient’s email client 
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program points to the wrapper and the wrapper 
in turn points to the real POP3 or IMAP server. 
Commands are transparently passed to the real 
server, but validation is applied to mail 
messages. This case is also intended to cover 
something like the Unix Procmail system, which 
is per-user. 
It is possible to consider placing the proxy 
between, say, Postfix and POP3, but this is 
generally difficult because these two programs 
usually communicate through the file system 
(using Maildir format, for example) as opposed 
to using TCP/IP. 
Validation before the initial MTA (Figure 2a) is 
by far the best solution, but it is also the one 
with the most organizational impact. Figure 2b 
would be desirable and is feasible for POP3 
servers. IMAP servers, however, are so complex 
that the validation would be difficult to 
implement. Merging the proxy with the email 
client again has the advantage of supporting 
incremental adoption, but is otherwise 
undesirable purely because is purely a per-user 
solution. 
9.3 Receiver-Side Caching 
The receiver-side validation proxy can utilize 
caching to significantly reduce the cost of 
validation. Figures 2a and 2b show a cache 
attached to the validation proxy. The cache 
maps the Reachback URL to the corresponding 
public key. Instead of always accessing the 
sender’s HTTP server, the validating proxy first 
checks the cache and if the Reachback URL is 
found, it attempts to validate using the matching 
public key. If the URL is not in the cache, or the 
cached key does not properly validate the 
message, then the sender’s HTTP server is 
accessed to obtain the key. That (URL,key) pair 
is inserted into the cache for subsequent use. 
Assuming a fixed size cache, some replacement 
policy must be defined. LRU would be a good 
choice although there may be semantic 
knowledge that could produce a better policy. 
The cache could also maintain a whitelist of 
senders that should never be replaced.  
10.  ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
There are a number of lesser, but still important 
issues that must be addressed with respect to the 
practical use of Reachback. 
10.1 Idempotence 
Ideally, validation for each message is done 
once on the sender side and once on the 
receiving side. In practice, it is likely that some 
users will implement Reachback themselves. 
Later, a site-wide deployment may occur. This 
means that it is possible for an email to have 
multiple Reachback URLs and/or to pass 
through multiple validation proxies. It is very 
desirable, then, if the Reachback process is 
idempotent so that second or later proxies will 
properly validate. 
On the sender side, repeated Reachback URLs 
cause no obvious problems. Each additional 
URL accesses a different public key any one of 
which is usable for validation, although the 
initial one is most valuable because it indicates 
the true sender. One solution is for senders to 
recognize a message with a Reachback URL 
header and just pass it on. After all, the original 
Reachback URL specifies the true and original 
source for the message. If multiple Reachback 
URLs exist, then they can, if desired, be 
validated successively to check all of them. 
On the receiving side, the first validation proxy 
can rewrite the header to flag the fact that it has 
performed the validation. Subsequent validation 
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proxies can check for this header flag. This 
provides a potential attack where the sender 
formats the message to look like it already has 
been validated, but still specifying a fake 
source. The solution is to “trust but verify.” 
Every validation proxy rechecks the validation. 
This introduces some overhead in the short term 
until the downstream proxies are removed in 
favor of the first proxy.  
10.2 Forwarding 
Forwarding – including various kinds of relays 
and proxies – involves adding a few new header 
lines to the email message and re-sending the 
message to a new destination. This causes 
problems for competing systems because they 
utilize the From header line to determine which 
DNS entry to check. In contrast, Reachback 
does not care about those header lines, which 
means that it is unaffected by forwarding. 
10.3 Mail Lists and Mail Digests 
Mail lists operate by collecting email messages 
from multiple senders and re-sending them to 
their subscribers. Digests are similar except that 
they will send out a single message that 
aggregates a number of submitted emails. 
There are four possible combinations of 
interactions between Reachback and mail lists 
depending on whether the sender or the mail list 
site uses Reachback. 
1. Sender: no; Mail list: no. There is no effect. 
2. Sender: yes; Mail list: no. The messages that 
are redistributed by the mail list will contain 
the Reachback URL pointing to the original 
validation information. 
3. Sender: no; Mail list: yes. The redistributed 
messages will use Reachback and the 
validation source will be the mail list site. 
4. Sender: yes; Mail list: yes. The idempotence 
argument applies (Section 10.1), but 
otherwise can be treated the same as case 2. 
10.4 Incremental Adoption 
It is clear from the experience of the Internet 
community that adoption of any anti-spam 
system will be a protracted process. Hence it is 
important that the system can be incrementally 
adopted with minimal disruption and with the 
ability to work with existing email clients and 
other email infrastructure. If it can be adopted 
by individual users in advance of site-wide 
adoption, then that is an important capability. 
Incremental adoption of Reachback is possible 
because individual sites, and even individual 
users, can begin to adopt Reachback as they see 
fit. Senders and receivers can adopt Reachback 
transparently; the only visible sign is the 
inclusion of the Reachback URL in the set of 
email headers. 
As with all anti-spam solutions, email that does 
not use the anti-spam solution cannot effectively 
be tested against a blacklist. Therefore, it is not 
possible to discriminate against such email until 
it is adopted widely. For Reachback, this 
situation occurs for messages that have no 
associated Reachback URL. In the short term, 
the only solution to this is to fall back on 
filtering. 
As discussed in Section 3, however, incremental 
adoption does provides value to users even in 
the absence of widespread adoption. This is 
because it supports an automatic whitelisting 
capability that is useful even in the absence of 
effective blacklisting. 
11. POTENTIAL ATTACK SCENARIOS 
It is difficult to guarantee that a given anti-spam 
system is really secure against attacks. The 
attackers (spammers in this case) are quite 
resourceful and may utilize attacks not 
considered by the developer. This section 
considers some possible attacks and how they 
can be addressed. 
11.1 Address Spoofing 
The primary methods [6] for spoofing email 
header addresses are zombies, open proxies, 
open mail relays, and transient internet 
connections. The last three cause no particular 
problem because Reachback does not use the 
From header or any other header except the 
Reachback URL. This means that forwarding 
through additional sites has no effect. The 
zombie issue is, however, of concern and is 
addressed specifically. 
Another possible address spoofing attack 
available to a spammer is to deliberately use a 
fake Reachback URL. Obviously using a 
completely fake URL will fail because no useful 
validation information can be provided. 
11.2 HTTP Server Spoofing 
Another kind of spoofing is possible where the 
spoofer sets up a dummy HTTP server. This 
server can be used in several ways. First, it can 
return the same RVI for all Reachback URLs 
that access it. The spoofer then inserts a fake 
Reachback URL based on that key and sends 
out the message. The receiver will then validate 
the message using that key. This kind of 
spoofing will not work for very long because 
that HTTP server site will rapidly be tagged as a 
spam source. 
The spoofer can also attempt to set up a large 
number of HTTP servers, but as discussed in 
Section 11.9 this can become prohibitively 
expensive. 
Another possible attack is to set up a server that 
pretends to provide validation information for a 
specific sender’s email address. This can work 
only if the spammer is in the same domain as 
the true sender and has access to the sender’s 
web pages. Serving information from any other 
site will fail against the URL format validation 
step. In this situation, the spammer has 
essentially compromised the whole site, so that 
spammer must be suppressed by administrative 
mechanisms. 
A less obvious attack is possible where the 
spoofer uses a special URL with the specific 
intent to get the recipient’s validation proxy to 
access it. This is a problem because historically 
some browsers have had serious implementation 
flaws. These flaws are such that just visiting a 
certain web site can cause the user’s computer 
to become compromised. Usually this occurs 
because the web server delivers unexpected 
content that causes code execution on the client 
side. This is an argument for doing validation 
without using any web-browser components. 
Rather, the validation proxy should be 
constructed from scratch to enforce the use of a 
simplified HTTP protocol by the server and thus 
suppress unexpected content. 
11.3 Zombies 
A zombie is a machine that has been 
compromised by some malicious hacker. The 
zombie’s software is modified so that the 
zombie will execute commands as desired by 
that hacker. Usually, a zombie belongs to some 
unsuspecting consumer. That consumer may not 
have the skills to detect that their machine is a 
zombie. 
Spammers are increasingly making use of 
zombies to send out their spam messages. The 
message appears to come from a legitimate 
source (the zombie machine). The zombie 
effectively becomes the true source of the 
message and this makes it hard for all anti-spam 
systems to suppress such spam. In theory, it is 
possible to blacklist zombie machines. 
Unfortunately, it is often the case that the 
zombie uses some other mail site to actually 
send its email: Google or Yahoo, for example. 
Obviously blacklisting everything from Yahoo 
is not feasible. 
Reachback has the potential to help address the 
zombie problem because it can identify spam 
sources down to the level of individual users. 
This means that it is in fact feasible to blacklist 
those specific users of Yahoo, for example, that 
are actually zombies and leave other users 
unaffected. This blacklist information can also 
be fed back to the mail site to help it identify 
zombie spammers. No competing approach can 
do this.  
The zombie may use a simple mail relay 
through its ISP. If the ISP supports Reachback, 
then the zombie can be properly blacklisted. If 
the ISP does not, then Reachback cannot say 
that the email is valid, and it must be dealt with 
as non-validated mail. 
The controller of the zombie may also add a 
Reachback server to the zombie so that any 
spam email sent from that zombie (correctly) 
appears to come from that zombie machine. But 
recall that validation of source does not mean 
that the source is not spam. The blacklist 
determines that property. Thus, a zombie 
sending validated spam would still end up on 
the blacklist in short order and all email from it 
would be suppressed.  
11.4 HTTP Server Hijacking 
It is possible that a malicious hacker can 
compromise some other site’s HTTP server. 
This is less likely if the server implements 
highly restricted functionality. Nevertheless, it 
must be considered a possibility. In any case, 
this would appear to be the same problem as 
server spoofing with the same solutions. 
11.5 DNS hijacking 
It is theoretically possible for a spammer to 
hijack legitimate DNS entries to point to one of 
his machines. This is a difficult attack to 
execute and is likely to be much more difficult 
as DNS security improves. This seems to be an 
issue for any of the anti-spam mechanisms and 
is not unique to Reachback. 
11.6 Receiver Anonymity 
The very act of using the Reachback URL to 
access the sender’s HTTP server provides 
information to the sender. It indicates that the 
email recipient exists and is reading email and it 
tells the sender the IP address of the recipient’s 
machine. This may be considered a significant 
loss of anonymity compared to the current email 
system. A spammer can use this information to 
target the recipient with traditional spam. 
Effective anonymity will return to every user 
when their site implements Reachback. This is 
because the validation proxy will be the 
component that retrieves the content 
independent of the legitimacy of the recipient 
addresses. This means the sender knows only 
the IP address of the machine running the 
validation proxy. Moreover, the spammer does 
not learn if any of the recipient addresses are in 
fact valid. 
11.7 Blacklist Poisoning 
Standard blacklists are subject to poisoning, 
which means that fraudulent spam messages are 
sent with legitimate From headers in an attempt 
to fill the blacklist with legitimate senders, thus 
rendering it useless. This is much more difficult 
with Reachback because the maintainer of the 
blacklist can retrieve the validation information 
and independently verify that the supposed 
spam source is in fact the originator of the spam 
message. 
11.8 Massive Email Address Space 
Any spammer who has access to a very large 
number of email addresses can potentially 
defeat any blacklist system. The spammer need 
only use each email address in turn to send a 
large amount of spam. After some period, the 
spammer moves on to use the next available 
email address. The obvious solution to this is to 
blacklist the whole subdomain, or domain, with 
which all of the email addresses are associated. 
This works fine when the spammer is using a 
zombie. It fails if the domain is “special” in that 
it represents one of the large email providers 
such as Google or Yahoo. In this case it is 
impossible to blacklist the whole domain 
because so many legitimate users would be 
affected. 
Google and Yahoo both allow free email 
registration, so in theory a spammer could use 
an automated robot to register as many email 
addresses as needed. Fortunately, these special 
domains have recognized this problem and have 
added mechanisms to their registration process 
to prevent automated registration. Google, for 
example, requires the registering person to have 
a mobile phone address with instant messaging. 
Yahoo uses a puzzle system that is difficult for 
automated systems to solve, but is easy for 
people to solve. 
11.9 Massive use of DNS names and IP 
Addresses. 
Massive use of DNS names presents a problem 
that is analogous to the massive email address 
problem. At least under IPV4, it is costly to own 
more than a few IP addresses. It is possible, 
though, to define an arbitrary number of DNS 
names as subdomains of some primary domain. 
In practice, the hierarchical nature of DNS 
names makes it possible to suppress large 
number of subdomains by moving up the name 
hierarchy. This means that while a spammer 
might have a million names of the form 
“name.spamdomain.com”, they all will share a 
common suffix: “spamdomain.com” in this 
case. That primary domain 
(“spamdomain.com”) can then be blacklisted. 
11.10 Inaccessible HTTP Server 
When a receiver gets an email and wants to 
validate it, the receiver must contact the 
specified HTTP server. It may be the case that 
the server is inaccessible. This may be the case 
because the server is down or its network 
connectivity has been severed or it is the subject 
of a denial-of-service (DOS) attack. 
One solution to the problem of server 
accessibility is to propagate the Reachback 
information to a number of sites across the 
Internet. Reachback URL caching (Section 9.3) 
is one example of this in which the Reachback 
information is propagated to the receiving site 
where it may be used even if the sending site is 
inaccessible. 
This approach may be extended by allowing 
other sites to provide the information and 
providing multiple, redundant Reachback URLs 
in the message. This is called Reachback 
delegation. In order for this work, the receiver 
must trust that the information at the delegated 
site is accurate. 
A variant of the PKI approach can be used to 
provide that trust. A well-known and trusted site 
can provide a service in which it is asked to 
obtain the Reachback information from some 
site. The trusted site accesses that information 
and signs that information plus information 
about its source. The trusted site uses its own 
private key, and its corresponding public key is 
assumed to be well-known. The signed version 
can then be placed at any convenient location in 
the web and used as the Reachback URL.  
Note that the Reachback delegator only attests 
to the IP address, DNS name, and Reachback 
information of the source. This is in contrast to 
other forms of attestation such as PKI or PGP 
web of trust, where the goal is to attest to some 
notion of “identity.” 
11.11 Active Impersonation 
Active impersonation, also called “man-in-the-
middle”, presents another possible source of 
attacks. In practice this seems relatively unlikely 
to be used by spammers because that level of 
control probably can be used to convert a site to 
a zombie. Nevertheless, the effects of such an 
attack are worth examining. 
It can be assumed that the active impersonator 
has the ability to (1) examine and arbitrarily 
modify any email being sent to a given receiver 
and/or (2) examine and arbitrarily modify any 
email being sent from a given sender. It is 
assumed that in either case, the impersonator 
has no other control over the sender or receiver. 
In either case, it appears that the impersonator 
has only a limited set of actions that it can take. 
The impersonator can completely replace the 
message with one of its own choosing, but that 
is equivalent to just sending spam. It cannot 
replace the body of the message without 
modifying the Reachback URL because the 
validation would fail. Replacing the URL (URL 
spoofing) has already been addressed in Section 
11.1. The only effective action the impersonator 
can take is to remove the Reachback URL 
completely. There is no short-term solution for 
managing email that has no Reachback URL. 
Existing filter-based solutions must be relied 
upon. 
12. REACHBACK VARIATIONS 
Reachback provides the option of using a single 
secret key instead of a public/private key pair. 
Of course, the single key must remain private to 
the sender and can never be revealed to any 
receiver. This method requires the receiver to 
send a cryptographic message authentication 
code (MAC) to the source. Operationally, the 
sender computes the secret key to compute a 
MAC value for a checksum of the message 
body. This MAC value is included in the 
Reachback URL as a parameter. When the 
sender is contacted using this URL, the sender 
performs the decryption and returns the 
unencrypted checksum to the receiver. The 
receiver compares the unencrypted checksum to 
a locally re-computed checksum. If they match, 
then it can be assumed that the email message 
came from the source specified by the 
Reachback URL. 
The use of a single secret key has one major 
drawback and two minor ones. The primary 
reason to avoid it is that local key caching 
cannot be used, so it must always perform an 
HTTP communication to the source. Less 
importantly, a plaintext attach is theoretically 
possible. An attacker could send an arbitrary 
value to the sender to be decoded. The returned 
value would then represent the plaintext for that 
sent value. This attack is easy to defeat. It is 
only necessary to force the unencrypted digest 
into a specific format such as duplicating the 
digest or adding a constant string to one end or 
the other. Then if the unencrypted plaintext did 
not conform to this format, the sender would not 
return the plaintext, but rather some fixed value 
indicating failure to decrypt. Periodic rekeying 
also would aid in defeating this attack. 
The other minor issue involves a denial of 
service attack in which the attacker repeatedly 
asks the HTTP server to decrypt a signature. 
This is relatively easy to defeat by introducing 
an artificial delay into the decrypting process 
based on the source of the decryption request. 
Reachback also offers the possibility of using 
other validation information in place of keys. 
Some of these alternatives are defined in the 
following paragraphs. 
1. Email body. The Reachback URL may 
provide a duplicate of the contents of the 
email, including selected headers. The 
content obtained by Reachback can be 
matched to the email content in the 
notification. Note that the accuracy of any 
included headers is irrelevant; it is only 
important that they match. 
2. Replacement. This is a variant of the 
preceding case. Instead of comparing the 
contents, the content of the email message is 
discarded and replaced by the content 
retrieved through Reachback. This has the 
advantage that the email message does not 
actually have to contain the contents at all, 
which results in smaller messages. This case 
has two drawbacks. First, such messages 
cannot be read offline unless validation 
occurs before being sent to the user. Second, 
if a non-Reachback user receives such a 
message, they must invoke a web-browser on 
the Reachback URL to access the mail’s 
contents. 
3. Per-message public key. The URL may 
provide a public key for the contents of each 
specific email. This is as opposed to per-user 
or per-site public keys. The retrieved public 
key is used to decrypt that specific email 
message. Of course this approach is not 
really very feasible if computing a 
public/private key for each email is costly (as 
it is). 
Note that cases 1 and 3 can also be carried out at 
the HTTP server. This allows the server to 
determine validity using any method it chooses 
and without the knowledge of the receiver. 
These alternative validation mechanisms are 
less desirable than reaching back for a key 
because they impose a much larger storage 
burden on the source site’s HTTP server, so 
some form of ageing of per-message validation 
information must be implemented. Nevertheless, 
these alternatives may be worth exploring in 
detail in the future. 
These alternatives are not possible with DNS-
based approaches because they are inherently 
oriented to domain level validation and are 
limited in the amount of information they can 
store in DNS. 
Reachback is also not restricted in the kind of 
source server used to obtain validation 
information. This is because the URL can 
encode both the protocol and the port to use at 
the sending site. So ports other than 80 can be 
used and protocols other than HTTP can be 
used: FTP for example. The primary 
requirement for the protocol is that it must 
support a very large address space capable of 
encoding some form of standardized URL as 
described in Section 5. HTTP meets this 
requirement through the URL structure. FTP 
can meet it through the use of its file structure.  
13.  RELATED WORK 
Anti-spam mechanism can usefully be classified 
into several categories: filtering, blacklists, and 
whitelists, and with variants on each. 
13.1 Filters 
The most common approach to detecting spam 
email is to use a filter program that examines 
each email message for specific features, scores 
them, and compares the score to a threshold to 
decide if the email is spam. Bayesian filters are 
often used to provide the score, but the filter 
must be trained to separate good email from 
spam email. When a new email is received, its 
content is passed through the filter and the 
estimate is obtained. Based on some threshold, 
it is then classified as spam or not spam. 
Spam filter programs are quite common and are 
reasonably effective. Users tend to set the spam 
threshold rather high in order to minimize the 
number of false-positives; hence they tend to 
have to deal with a large number of false-
negatives. Filter approaches are complementary 
to all blacklist approaches and indeed are 
essential for making the initial detection that 
spam is being issued from some source. 
13.2 Whitelisting 
A number of whitelist approaches exist. They 
operate by defining the set of sources allowed to 
communicate with a given recipient. Two 
common mechanisms are PGP Mail and 
Challenge-Response. 
PGP Mail [16] uses a private key pair to encrypt 
email. The receiver uses the private key to 
decrypt it. If the public key can be definitively 
associated with the sender, then PGP mail can 
be used for source verification. In practice, PGP 
Mail operates as a whitelist. The owner of the 
public key restricts access to it by giving it to 
selected trusted receivers; this distribution is 
equivalent to constructing a whitelist. The goal 
is to prevent unauthorized reading of the email. 
As a rule, each sender and receiver must 
maintain their own whitelist. This maintenance 
can be time-consuming since the set of 
acceptable partners is likely to change fairly 
rapidly. The whitelisting capabilities of 
Reachback (Section 3) address this problem 
since whitelist maintenance is effectively 
automated. 
13.3 Challenge-Response 
The challenge-response mechanism [7,12] 
provides a form of whitelisting. When an email 
message is received, the receiver returns a 
separate message to the sender that requires the 
sending person to solve some form of puzzle. 
Typically a human is required to solve the 
puzzle because it is not easily solved by any 
form of automatic robot. If the action is 
correctly performed, that source is added to the 
whitelist. The assumption is that a spammer will 
not have the resources to respond to such 
requests and that the requested action is difficult 
to automate. This approach has not been widely 
used because it breaks the “fire-and-forget” 
model for email where the sending user does not 
need to deal with a sent email until such time as 
an answer is returned by the sender. Challenge-
response requires extra work on the part of the 
user. So unless the message is rather important, 
the validating request is just ignored. Further, 
this approach does not deal well with messages 
coming from a legitimate mailing list. In 
contrast, Reachback obtains its validation 
information automatically whereas Challenge-
Response requires a person to be “in-the-loop” 
of validation. 
13.4 Greylisting 
Greylisting [11] provides another whitelisting 
approach that utilizes the inherent retry 
capabilities of the email system. Upon initial 
receipt of an email with a unique combination of 
sender, receiver, and proximate sending host, it 
returns a rejection of that email to that host. This 
rejection is repeated for some short period of 
time. The assumption is that spam email senders 
will not attempt to retry the send while 
legitimate senders will retry. Of course, 
spammers may adapt to it by retrying sends, but 
it would appear to be useful as a complement to 
other spam suppression mechanisms, including 
Reachback. 
13.5 Blacklisting 
All blacklisting approaches require the ability to 
accurately identify the true source of an email. 
To date, the sources of such information have 
come from two sources: the From header in the 
email message, or (2) from the remote IP 
address of the proximate site that sent the email. 
In the face of header spoofing and email 
forwarding, the first source is suspect. The 
second source is reliable but may not be the 
actual source if email forwarding or relaying has 
occurred. 
In any case, almost all current blacklist 
approaches utilize the Internet Domain Name 
System (DNS) to store validation information 
about the assumed source. The idea is that 
validation information is inserted into DNS by 
every legitimate source. The receiver of an 
email then accesses that validation information 
and validates the email. If the validation fails, or 
the sending site is known to be a spam site 
(based on the blacklist), then the email is 
marked as spam. 
The various DNS-based systems are 
differentiated by what they use as the sending 
address and, more importantly, the validation 
information they place in DNS. All DNS-based 
systems, however, have certain common 
drawbacks. 
1. Storage Cost: DNS is a shared resource for 
the whole Internet. Storing validation 
information in DNS forces all DNS servers 
to pay the storage cost. 
2. Granularity: DNS-based anti-spam cannot 
support a granularity much finer than an IP 
address (mail host machine) primarily 
because that is the level of granularity 
supported by DNS and also because any 
attempt to move to a finer grain could rapidly 
overload DNS servers. 
3. Zombies: The limited granularity makes it 
difficult to do anything about zombies that 
send email using large sites such as Google 
or Yahoo. 
4. Incremental Adoption: DNS-based systems 
require site level adoption because the site 
owns the DNS record of interest. 
Reachback, in contrast, does not suffer from 
these problems. The validation information is 
maintained by each site, so storage overload is 
not an issue. This means that Reachback can 
support almost arbitrary levels of granularity. 
Further, the finer grain supported by Reachback 
provides at least a partial solution to the zombie 
problem. Reachback has better support for 
incremental adoption. It can be adopted by 
individual users or groups of users just by 
establishing their own HTTP server to serve the 
source keys for that group of users. 
The two most important DNS-based systems are 
DomainKeys and Sender-ID. DomainKeys was 
invented – and patented – by Yahoo [8,10]. The 
general operation of DomainKeys is as follows: 
1. Extract the From header from the email 
message. Note that DomainKeys, as 
currently defined, does not use proximate 
sender information, but it could do so quite 
easily. 
2. Use the domain part of the header to access 
the corresponding DomainKeys record from 
some DNS server. Note that DomainKeys 
allows for the use of “selectors” to extract a 
subset of information from the DNS record. 
The selector can be used to define a limited 
amount of sub-domain information; the 
limitation is that it must avoid overloading 
DNS. 
3. Extract the public key for the domain (or 
sub-domain) from the DNS record.  
4. Decrypt the digital signature embedded into 
the email message (as a special header line) 
to produce a checksum. 
5. Compare the locally computed checksum to 
the decrypted checksum and if they match, 
then the email is validated. 
Reachback is an explicit alternative to 
DomainKeys, so it is useful to delimit the 
differences between the two approaches. 
1. Reachback extracts information from an 
HTTP server specific to the originating 
source; DomainKeys uses the Domain Name 
System (DNS) to store validation 
information.  
2. Reachback can utilize a variety of servers to 
provide Reachback validation information; it 
can even delegate the validation information 
to servers outside of its domain. 
3. Reachback supports very fine grain 
validation: down to the level of individual 
email addresses. 
4. Reachback ignores From headers and so is 
relatively immune to in-transit modifications; 
such modifications to the From header can 
cause DomainKeys to erroneously signal a 
forgery;  
5. Reachback has the potential (Section 12) to 
utilize validation information other than 
public/private key pairs, even information 
private to the Reachback site; DomainKeys is 
effectively limited to the use of key pairs for 
validation in order to avoid overloading 
DNS. 
Sender-ID [3,4,14] is a Microsoft patented 
solution that is also DNS-based. It is derived 
from earlier work called RMX [17] and SPF 
(Sender-Policy Framework) [20]. Many of the 
differences listed above also apply to Sender-
ID. 
Sender-ID utilizes the remote IP address of the 
proximate sender of the email. This information 
is available for any TCP connection and is 
reliable. This IP address is compared to a list of 
legal email server machines for the sender site 
as defined in the site’s DNS record. If the sender 
is not allowed, or is blacklisted, then validation 
fails. Aside from the DNS-based problems, 
Sender-ID also had difficulty with email 
forwarding and relaying because those 
mechanisms make it hard to determine the 
original source of the email. 
RMX++ [17] is another DNS-based anti-spam 
system very much like Sender-ID. It adds one 
important feature; instead of placing the policy 
information in DNS directly, it places a URL in 
DNS and the URL is used to obtain additional 
DNS records. It still requires DNS, but there is 
no danger of overloading it. As with Reachback, 
it uses an HTTP server to store validation 
information, although the information is not a 
key, but rather Sender-ID style information. It 
avoids many of the DNS problems although it 
still requires site-wide adoption. 
PGP Mail has already been described, but it can 
also be used for blacklisting. A DNS-like key 
repository network exists for PGP keys. A 
public key owner registers the key with the 
repository. Unfortunately, it appears that at the 
moment there is no verification associated with 
the registry key. This means that an email 
receiver has no confidence in the identity of the 
key owner. In addition, there is no limit to the 
number of keys that can be registered, so a 
spammer can in theory provide a different key 
for every email. This makes blacklisting 
extremely difficult. 
14.  STATUS 
This system is in the process of being 
prototyped, so performance and scale data are 
not yet available. The prototypes are being 
derived from existing well-known email 
components. Open source components are being 
used where feasible. 
The server side will use an SMTP proxy. The 
receiver side prototype will be done using either 
a Postfix server combined with a validation 
proxy or a POP3/IMAP wrapper combined with 
a validation proxy. 
Several metrics must be collected in order to 
determine the scalability of this approach. One 
metric will be the cost to reach back to an HTTP 
server. Another metric will be the required 
cache size needed to cover some large fraction 
of received email. 
15.  SUMMARY 
Reachback provides a unique new approach to 
the spam suppression problem. Unlike 
competing approaches it does not use DNS. It 
can use the existing email distribution system, it 
is robust against in-transit modifications to the 
standard From headers and mail forwarding, 
and most importantly, it can identify sources 
down to the granularity of individual users. It 
has the option to use single secret keys instead 
of more costly public/private key pairs. It can be 
incrementally deployed by individual users and 
can provide incremental value through 
automated whitelisting. 
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